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The New Minnesota Fireman's Rule-An Application
of the Assumption of Risk Doctrine: Armstrong v.
Mailand
Three fire fighters died while battling a fire at a liquified pe-
troleum (LP) gas storage facility. The fire started when a deliv-
eryman failed to follow proper procedures in filling an 11,000
gallon LP gas tank. When the fire fighters were unable to shut
off the flow of gas from the delivery vehicle, the fire spread to
the storage facility. Following standard operating procedure,
the fire fighters hosed down the storage tank in order to pre-
vent an explosion. Their efforts were unsuccessful; a valve on
the storage tank released improperly, the tank exploded, and
three fire fighters were killed. The fire fighters' representatives
subsequently brought a wrongful death action against the own-
er of the facility and the companies responsible for its design,
construction, installation, and maintenance.' Despite evidence
of negligence, fire code violations, and defective products,2 the
district court granted summary judgment to all defendants
under one form of the widely accepted fireman's rule,3 which
has traditionally limited a landowner's liability to injured fire
fighters.4 Although it altered the substance of that rule, the
1. The defendants included not only the owner of the facility but also the
company that ordered and installed the tank and the company that was refuel-
ing the tank when the fire was ignited. See Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d
343, 343, 346 (Minn. 1979).
2. Although the court did not discuss in detail the evidence supporting
these theories of liability, it indicated that there was evidence of failure to in-
stall the appropriate relief valve in the tank, failure to discover the improper
valve, violation of the fire code by housing the tank and the vaporizing unit in
the same structure, defects in the delivery truck, and improper procedures
used in refilling the storage tank. Id. at 346.
3. For examples of cases applying various versions of the fireman's rule,
see Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 202, 571 P.2d 609, 610, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152, 154
(1977); Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 355, 360, 72 CaL Rptr.
119, 123 (1968); Romedy v. Johnston, 193 So. 2d 487, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967);
Buren v. Midwest Indus., Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96, 97-98 (Ky. 1964); Aravanis v. Eisen-
berg, 237 Md. 242, 251-53, 206 A.2d 148, 153-54 (1965); Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270,
273-74, 157 A.2d 129, 130-31 (1960); Jackson v. Velveray Corp., 82 N.J. Super. 469,
475, 198 A.2d 115, 118 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964); McGee v. Adams Paper &
Twine Co., 26 A.D.2d 186, 190, 271 N.Y.S.2d 698, 706 (1966), aff'd, 20 N.Y.2d 921,
233 N.E.2d 289, 286 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1967); Suttie v. Sun Oil Co., 15 Pa. D. & C. 3, 5-6
(Philadelphia County Ct. 1931); Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Campagna, 146 Tenn.
389, 393-94, 242 S.W. 646, 647 (1922) (dictum).
4. For a" discussion of the traditional fireman's rule, see text accompany-
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Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that landowners
owe fire fighters a duty of reasonable care, but that fire fighters
primarily assume all those risks that are reasonably apparent
to them as fire fighters.5 In so holding, the court concluded that
the landowner's duty does not depend on whether fire fighters
are classified as licensees, invitees, or sui generis. The court
simply indicated that fire fighters are owed the same duty of
care that is owed to all land entrants, except to the extent that
they assume risks in a primary sense.6 Armstrong v. Mailand,
284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979).
Courts have traditionally held that the duties owed to fire
ing notes 15-19 infra. Variations on the traditional rule are discussed at text
accompanying notes 22-27 infra.
5. Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 350 (Minn. 1979). Primary as-
sumption of risk is not an affirmative defense; rather, it is tantamount to a find-
ing of no duty. It relates to the threshold question of whether the defendant
was negligent. See, e.g., Bull S.S. Lines v. Fisher, 196 Md. 519, 524, 77 A.2d 142,
145 (1950); Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 348 (Minn. 1979); Springrose
v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971). It arises in a voluntary
relationship between two parties in which the duties owed by one party are
limited with respect to risks that are incidental to the relationship. See Olson
v. Hansen, 299 Minn. 39, 44, 216 N.W.2d 124, 127 (1974).
Primary assumption of risk should be distinguished from secondary as-
sumption of risk, which is an affirmative defense. A defendant asserting secon-
dary assumption of risk is arguing that the plaintiff voluntarily and
unreasonably encountered a known, appreciated risk without an attendant
manifestation that he consented to relieve the defendant of his duty. See Arm-
strong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 349 (Minn. 1979); Springrose v. Willmore, 292
Minn. 23, 24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971). Both primary and secondary assump-
tion of risk, however, require actual, not constructive, knowledge of the danger.
See Olson v. Hansen, 299 Minn. 39, 44, 45, 216 N.W.2d 124, 127, 128 (1974);
Coenen v. Buckman Bldg. Corp., 278 Minn. 193, 204-05, 153 N.W.2d 329, 337-38
(1967); Zuber v. Northern Pac. Ry., 246 Minn. 157, 172, 74 N.W.2d 641, 653 (1956).
Some states, including Minnesota, have abolished secondary assumption of
risk as a distinct concept, and instead view it as a form of contributory negli-
gence. See, e.g., Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 24-25, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827
(1971); Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 54-55, 155 A.2d 90,
95-96 (1959).
Thus, only primary assumption of risk remains a part of the substantive
law in Minnesota. It is distinguished from contributory negligence principally
by the importance that the subjective awareness of the plaintiff plays in its ap-
plication. As stated above, primary assumption of risk requires actual knowl-
edge of the danger. Contributory negligence, on the other hand, requires only a
deviation from the objective standard of the reasonable person. See Peterson v.
Minnesota Power & Light Co., 206 Minn. 268, 270-71, 288 N.W. 588, 589 (1939). Un-
like contributory negligence, primary assumption of risk does not require that
the plaintiff's conduct deviate from the standards observed by the reasonable
person. It can be reasonable for a person to assume a risk, but the reasonable
person will never be found contributorily negligent. He may, however, be held
to have relieved others of their duties to him through his assumption of the
risks they have created. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 68,
at 440-41 (4th ed. 1971).
6. 284 N.W.2d at 349-50. See note 5 supra.
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fighters, like those owed to other land entrants, depended on
how the entrants were classified.7 Entrants were classified as
invitees, licensees, or trespassers: invitees if they entered the
property for the owner's economic benefit pursuant to either
the owner's specific invitation8 or a general invitation to the
public;9 licensees if they entered with the owner's permission
but not for the owner's economic benefit;10 trespassers if they
entered without either permission or invitation." Under the
traditional rule, the landowner was obligated to maintain his
premises in a reasonably safe condition for invitees, 2 but not
for licensees1 3 or trespassers.14
Under the original fireman's rule, courts classified fire
fighters as licensees who, like trespassers, were owed no duty
by-the owner to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condi-
tion.15 Courts neither recognized nor condemned the anomaly
7. See, e.g., Lunt v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 48 Colo. 316, 322-24, 110
P. 203, 205 (1910); Roberts v. Rosenblatt, 146 Conn. 110, 112-13, 148 A-2d 142, 144
(1959); Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805, 807, 49 N.W.2d 707, 709
(1951).
8. See, e.g., Holmes v. Cagle, 356 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Te. Civ. App. 1962).
9. See, e.g., Glowacki v. A.J. Bayless Markets, Inc., 76 Ariz. 295, 306, 263
P.2d 799, 806 (1953); Royer v. Najarian, 60 R.I. 368, 372, 198 A. 562, 564 (1938).
10. See, e.g., Bruno v. Seigel, 73 So. 2d 674, 674-75 (Fla. 1954); Pearlstein v.
Leeds, 52 N.J. Super. 450, 457-59, 145 A.2d 650, 654 (1958).
11. See, e.g., Augusta Ry. v. Andrews, 89 Ga. 653, 655, 16 S.E. 203, 203 (1892);
Farmer v. Modern Motors Co., 235 Ky. 483, 485-86, 31 S.W.2d 716, 717 (1930).
12. See, e.g., Dickey v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 157 Md. 448, 450-51, 146 A.
282, 283 (1929) (holding that a store proprietor owes an invitee "the duty of ex-
ercising ordinary care to see that the place where [items for sale] are displayed
and the approaches thereto are in such a condition as not to imperil [the invi-
tee]"); Straight v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 354 Pa. 391, 394, 47 A.2d 605, 607 (1946)
(holding that a landowner owes an invitee "the duty either to exercise reason-
able care to disclose to [the invitee] dangerous conditions known to [the land-
owner] and not likely to be discovered by [the invitee] or to make such
conditions reasonably safe").
13. See, e.g., Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 133, 137-38, 148 P.2d 19, 21-22
(1944); O'Brien v. Union Freight R.R., 209 Mass. 449, 452-53, 95 N.E. 861, 862-63
(1911). But see Straight v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 354 Pa. 391, 394, 47 A.2d 605, 607
(1946) (holding that landowners owe the same duties to licensees as to invi-
tees). See also Bohlen, The Duty of a Landouner Toward Those Entering His
Premises of Their Own Right (pt. II), 69 U. PA. L. Rav. 237, 243-52 (1921).
14. See, e.g., McPheters v. Loomis, 125 Conn. 526, 531-33, 7 A.2d 437, 440-41
(1939); Augusta Ry. v. Andrews, 89 Ga. 653, 655, 16 S.E. 203, 203 (1892); Farmer v.
Modern Motors Co., 235 Ky. 483, 485-86, 31 S.W.2d 716, 717 (1930). See also Boh-
len, supra note 13, at 238-43.
15. See, e.g., Roberts v. Rosenblatt, 146 Conn. 110, 113, 148 A.2d 142, 144
(1959) (because fireman's status was "akin to that of a licensee," owner "owed
him no greater duty than that due a licensee"); Baxley v. Williams Constr. Co.,
98 Ga. App. 662, 669, 106 S.E.2d 799, 805 (1958) (because fireman is a licensee,
owner does not owe him "the high degree of care owed to an invitee"); Mul-
crone v. Wagner, 212 Minn. 478, 482, 4 N.W.2d 97, 99 (1942) (fireman "is a licen-
see to whom the owner or occupant owes no duty except to refrain from
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of this classification. Unlike other licensees, fire fighters enter
premises not for their own benefit, but for the benefit of the
public.16 Moreover, the lawfulness of their entry is not contin-
gent upon the landowner's consent.17 Nevertheless, under the
traditional approach fire fighters remained licensees.18 This
classification relieved owners of liability for two broad types of
injury. It made little difference whether the fire fighter was in-
jured as a result of the landowner's negligence in causing the
fire, or as a result of hidden dangers on the premises that were
entirely unrelated to the fire. In the absence of egregious mis-
conduct, the owner was not liable under the original fireman's
rule.19
Courts have attempted to justify the harshness of this de-
nial of liability by emphasizing that the circumstances of fire
fighters' visits are peculiar and that undesirable consequences
would follow any attempt to abolish the rule. Fire fighters visit
infrequently and usually at odd hours. The exigencies of the
moment, and not the niceties of social etiquette, determine
their modes of ingress and egress. For example, windows,
injuring him willfully or wantonly and to exercise ordinary care to avoid imper-
iling him by any active conduct"); Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Afg. Co., 78
Minn. 3, 5, 80 N.W. 693, 694 (1899) ("owner or occupant of a building owed no
duty to keep it in a reasonably safe condition for members of a public fire de-
partment"); Scheurer v. Trustees of The Open Bible Church, 175 Ohio St. 163,
171-72, 192 N.E.2d 38, 43 (1963) (because firemen are licensees, owner owes
them limited set of duties) (dictum).
16. See, e.g., Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., 232 Minn. 394, 396-97,
45 N.W.2d 549, 551 (1951).
17. See, e.g., Dini v. Naiditch, 20 1ll. 2d 406, 415-16, 170 N.E.2d 881, 885 (1960);
Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 272-73, 157 A.2d 129, 130 (1960); Meiers v. Fred Koch
Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 14-15, 127 N.E. 491,492 (1920); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE
LAw OF TORTS § 27.14, at 1501 (1956); W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 61, at 396.
18. Some courts recognized the anomaly of classifying firemen as licensees
and reclassified them as sui generis without, however, altering the duties owed
them. See, e.g., Beedenbender v. Midtown Properties, Inc., 4 A.D.2d 276, 280-82,
164 N.Y.S.2d 276, 280-81 (1957); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Crouch, 208 Va. 602, 608,
159 S.E.2d 650, 654-55, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 845 (1968). After classifying firemen
as sui generis, the Beedenbender court imposed on the landowner two duties
that the court had imposed in previous cases. One of these duties had been
stated by the court in Schwab v. Rubel Corp., 286 N.Y. 525, 530, 37 N.E.2d 234,
236 (1941), and the other had been stated in Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229
N.Y. 10, 17, 127 N.E. 491, 493 (1920). Although Chesapeake was a case of first
impression, the court observed that the classification of fire fighters as sui
generis did not prevent the court from following "the almost unbroken line of
decisions holding non-liability to firemen for negligence in the creation of fire."
208 Va. at 608, 159 S.E.2d at 655.
One court both reclassified fire fighters as sui generis and altered the du-
ties owed them, but it is not clear whether the reclassification itself compelled
the alteration. See Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., 232 Minn. 394, 396-
402, 45 N.W.2d 549, 550-53 (1951).
19. See cases cited in note 15 supra.
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roofs, and skylights can occasionally provide more serviceable
means of access to a burning building than doors and en-
tryways. At least one court has implied that, under such cir-
cumstances, it would be unreasonable to require landowners to
make their premises reasonably safe for fire fighters' unusual
and infrequent visits. 20 Courts have also justified the fireman's
rule by suggesting that an expansion of tort liability would de-
ter landowners from promptly summoning the assistance of fire
fighters. 21
A vast majority of courts, influenced by a general trend to-
ward expansion of the duties owed to land entrants 22 and ac-
knowledging the injustice -of the fireman's rule, have created
exceptions that make the rule adhere more closely to the gen-
eral principles of negligence law.23 For example, courts have
held that landowners owe firemen a duty not only to refrain
from active negligence,24 but also to warn of hidden perils, 25 to
20. See Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 15-16, 127 N.E. 491, 492-93
(1920). In Meiers, a fireman on his way to put out a fire in the landowner's barn
was injured when he fell into an unguarded coal hole in the driveway. The
court, in holding that the landowner owed the fireman the duty of keeping the
driveway reasonably safe, emphasized that the fireman had "entered the prem-
ises, rightfully, on the way adapted by the owner for that purpose." Id. at 16,
127 N.E. at 493. The court also noted that although the fireman's entry was after
dark, the driveway was sometimes used after dark, both by one of the land-
owner's customers and by the fire department on at least one of the several
previous occasions when the barn had been on fire. Id. The Meiers court thus
implied that, had the fireman entered by an unusual route, had the route never
been used by land entrants after dark, and had the fire department never
before used the route, the landowner would have owed the fireman no duty to
keep the route reasonably safe. See generally 26 CoLtum. L REV. 116 (1926); 22
MmwN. L. REv. 898 (1938).
Commentators have observed, however, that imposition of the duty of rea-
sonable care inherent in the concept of negligence would not be unfair to land-
owners, insofar as they would be required only to guard against those
unreasonable dangers that were foreseeable. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMs,
supra note 17, § 27.14, at 1501-02; W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 61, at 397-98.
21. See Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., 232 Minn. 394, 397-98, 45
N.W.2d 549, 551 (1951) (lines jumbled in state reporter); Suttie v. Sun Oil Co., 15
Pa. D. & C. 3, 5-6 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1931). But see 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMEs, supra note 17, § 27.14, at 1503 (landowner would not be deterred "When
the threat to his life or his property was imminent enough for him to ... turn
in an alarm"); W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 61, at 397 (this justification is "pre-
posterous rubbish").
22. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 62, at 398-99.
23. See text accompanying notes 25-27 infra. See also RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS §§ 342-345 (1965).
24. See, e.g., Anderson v. Cinnamon, 365 Mo. 304, 307, 282 S.W.2d 445, 447
(1955).
25. See, e.g., Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., 232 Minn. 394, 401-42,
45 N.W.2d 549, 553 (1951); Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 37th St. Corp., 284 N.Y. 397, 401-
02, 31 N.E.2d 503, 504 (1940); James v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 66 Ohio App. 87, 94-95,
31 N.E.2d 872, 875-76 (1939), aff'd, 140 Ohio St. 314, 43 N.E.2d 276 (1942).
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fulfill the requirements of local fire safety ordinances, 2 6 and to
maintain in a reasonably safe condition those parts of the
premises held open for the use of invitees. 27
Despite this general expansion of liability for injuries suf-
fered as a result of a violation of a statute and defects in the
premises that are unrelated to the fire, almost all courts have
refused to grant fire fighters a cause of action for injuries proxi-
mately caused by the negligently ignited fire itself.28 A possible
rationale for this modified fireman's rule is public policy. At
least one court has argued, with little consistency, both that fire
fighters are already liberally compensated for their injuries and
that fire fighters should not complain of negligence in the crea-
tion of a fire whose existence necessitated their presence. 29
Another possible rationale for such a modified fireman's rule is
the doctrine of assumption of risk, which arguably mandates
that owners and occupants do not owe fire fighters a duty of
reasonable care with respect to those risks that they have pri-
marily assumed.30
26. See Dini v. Naiditch, 20 111. 2d 406, 419-21, 170 N.E.2d 881, 887-88 (1960);
Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 259-60, 206 A.2d 148, 157-58 (1965). For dis-
cussions of Dini v. Naiditch, see 38 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 75 (Apr. 1961); 47 COR-
NELL L.Q. 119 (1961); 14 VAND. L. REV. 1541 (1961). But see Aldworth v. F.W.
Woolworth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 347-49, 3 N.E.2d 1008, 1010-11 (1936) (fireman not
protected by statute requiring safe fire escapes).
27. See, e.g., Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 15-16, 127 N.E. 491,
492-93 (1920) (landowner owed duty of reasonable care to fireman injured on
driveway used by invitees); Beedenbender v. Midtown Properties, Inc., 4 A.D.2d
276, 281, 164 N.Y.S.2d 276, 280-81 (1957) (landowner owes to firemen a duty "to
use reasonable care to keep in safe condtion those parts of the premises which
are utilized as the ordinary means of access for all persons entering thereon")
(dictum). See also Comment, Liability of Property Owners Towards Policemen
and Firemen, 25 ALB. L. REv. 105, 105-07 (1961); Note, Landowner's Negligence
Liability to Persons Entering as a Matter of Right or Under a Privilege of Pri-
vate Necessity, 19 VAND. L. REV. 407, 409-17 (1966); 34 HARV. I- RE:V. 87-88 (1920);
30 YALE L.J. 93 (1920).
Courts in several states have declared generally that landowners owe
firemen the same duty of reasonable care owed to invitees. See, e.g., Dini v.
Naiditch, 20 IlM. 2d 406, 416-17, 170 N.E.2d 881, 886 (1960); Horcher v. Guerin, 94
Ill. App. 2d 244, 246-47, 236 N.E.2d 576, 578 (1968); Strong v. Seattle Stevedore
Co., 1 Wash. App. 898, 902-03, 466 P.2d 545, 548-49 (1970); cf. Cameron v. Abatiell,
127 Vt. 111, 115-18, 241 A.2d 310, 313-15 (1968) (holding policeman to be an invi-
tee for whom premises must be kept reasonably safe).
28. See, e.g., Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 250-51, 206 A.2d 148, 153
(1965); Hass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 48 Wis. 2d 321, 327, 179 N.W.2d 885, 888
(1970); cases cited in notes 29-30 infra. But see Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v.
O'Leary, 136 S.W. 601, 605 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
29. See Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 202, 204-06, 571 P.2d 609, 610, 612-13,
142 Cal. Rptr. 152, 153, 155-56 (1977).
30. See, e.g., Spencer v. B.P. John Furniture Corp., 255 Ore. 359, 362-64, 467
P.2d 429, 430-31 (1970); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Crouch, 208 Va. 602, 606-09, 159
S.E.2d 650, 653-55, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 845 (1968). See also note 5 supra.
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Minnesota adopted the original fireman's rule in 189931 and
followed it until 1951 when, in Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prod-
ucts Co.,32 the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged the
anomaly of classifying fire fighters as licensees, 3 3 reclassified
them as sui generis, and created an exception to the original
rule.34 The court held that a landowner has a duty to warn fire
fighters of hidden dangers of which the landowner is aware, if
the landowner has an opportunity to do so. 35 The status of this
modified rule was threatened in 1972, when the court held in
Peterson v. Balach36 that the classification of land entrants as
licensees or invitees was no longer determinative of the land-
owner's duty.3 7 Since under Shypulski the duties owed to fire
fighters were more extensive than those owed to licensees but
less extensive than those owed to invitees, it was unclear
whether the sui generis classification remained valid or
whether the Peterson decision had, by implication, abolished it
and imposed upon landowners a duty of reasonable care.
In Armstrong, the Minnesota Supreme Court resolved this
uncertainty by holding that Peterson had abolished the sui
generis classification 38 and that fire fighters are owed a duty of
reasonable care.3 9 Fire fighters, like any land entrants, how-
ever, may relieve landowners of this duty by primarily assum-
ing the risk of injury. Under Armstrong, a fire fighter is held to
primarily assume all those risks that are reasonably apparent
to him as a fire fighter, but not those that are either hidden or
unanticipated. 40 This assumption of risk may be found not only
31. See Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co., 78 Minn. 3, 5, 80 N.W. 693,
694 (1899). Plaintiff fire fighter fell through an unguarded elevator shaft while
fighting a fire on defendant's property. The court offered no rationale for re-
versing an order that had overruled defendant's demurrer. It simply described
as settled law the proposition that the owner of a building owes "no duty to
keep it in a reasonably safe condition for members of a public fire department
who might, in the exercise of their duties, have occasion to enter the building."
Id.
32. 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951).
33. See note 18 supra.
34. 232 Minn. at 396-97, 401-02, 45 N.W.2d at 550-51, 553.
35. Id. at 401-02, 45 N.W.2d at 553.
36. 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972).
37. Id. at 173, 199 N.W.2d at 647.
38. The court reasoned that since the duties that were owed to the sui
generis plaintiffs in Peterson were more extensive than those owed to licensees
and less extensive than those owed to invitees, the abolition of both of the lat-
ter categories in Peterson also destroyed the sui generis classification. 284
N.W.2d at 349.
39. Id. at 350.
40. Id. at 350. This results in an expansion of the duty that was imposed in
Shypulski. The court in Shypulski did not impose liability for injuries caused
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in an action for negligence per se 41 but also in actions for strict
products liability and for strict liability for an abnormally dan-
gerous activity.42
The court's use of the assumption of risk doctrine as the
foundation of the fireman's rule may be strongly criticized. A
prerequisite to any such assumption of risk is an appreciation
by the plaintiff of the particular risk involved and the magni-
tude of that risk.43 These elements point to the consensual na-
ture of the assumption: to be effective, an assumption of risk
must be both voluntary and intelligent. It is questionable
whether a fire fighter's decision to combat a blaze can be prop-
erly characterized as voluntary. It is a fire fighter's public duty
to face risks inherent in fire fighting. If he wishes to keep his
job, he must fight fires and, if necessary, risk his life in doing
so. In choosing to work as a fire fighter, a reasonable person
will know that the job will require him to face unusual risks,
by hidden defects that were unrelated to the fire unless the landowner both
knew of the defect and had an opportunity to warn. 232 Minn. at 401-02, 45
N.W.2d at 553. Armstrong, on the other hand, imposes liability when the land-
owner should have known of the defect and does not require the existence of
an opportunity to warn. See 284 N.W.2d at 350. Although the Armstrong court
did not expressly describe this expansion of the Shypulski-type liability as a
corollary of its use of assumption of risk doctrine, it appears to be a corollary:
for the fire fighter to primarily assume the risk, he must intelligently appreciate
it, and, unless the risk is apparent, he cannot do so in the absence of a warning.
It makes little difference fpom the fire fighter's point of view whether the land-
owner knew of the risk or had an opportunity to warn; if the fireman does not
know of the unreasonable danger, he cannot assume the risk of injury.
41. 284 N.W.2d at 350. After holding that assumption of risk is a defense in
actions based on negligence per se, the court declined to consider whether fire
fighters are within the class of persons protected by the fire codes. Id. at 353.
The court's holding that the assumption of risk defense applies to negli-
gence per se actions is consistent with Scott v. Independent School Dist. No.
709, 256 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. 1977), in which the court held that a contribu-
tory negligence defense generally applies to negligence per se actions. The
Armstrong court's position regarding the applicability of assumption of risk de-
fenses to negligence per se actions is similar to that of the Second Restatement
of Torts, which provides: 'The plaintiff's assumption of risk bars his recovery
for the defendant's violation of a statute, unless such a result would defeat a
policy of the statute to place the entire responsibility for such harm as has oc-
curred upon the defendant." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496F (1965).
42. 284 N.W.2d at 352. After holding that assumption of risk is a defense in
actions predicated on strict products liability and strict liability for an abnor-
mally dangerous activity, the court declined to consider whether recovery is
available to fire fighter bystanders under the theory of the Restatement of Torts,
RESTATEMENT, supra note 41, § 402A (strict products liability), and "Whether
the operation of an 11,000-gallon LP gas facility is an abnormally dangerous ac-
tivity," 284 N.W.2d at 353.
43. See, e.g., Lametti v. Peter Lametti Constr. Co., 305 Minn. 72, 77-78, 232
N.W.2d 435, 440 (1975); Coenen v. Buckman Bldg. Corp., 278 Minn. 193, 204-05,
153 N.W.2d 329, 337-38 (1967).
1980]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
many of them negligently caused. Nevertheless, a person
should not have to choose between forgoing employment as a
fire fighter and risking severe, uncompensated or undercom-
pensated injury. In describing the fire fighter's conduct as vol-
untary, the court is requiring him to make this choice.44
The court also failed to discuss the possible relevance of
the rescue doctrine to fireman's rule cases. The rescue doctrine
allows a cause of action to a person injured while making a rea-
sonably prudent attempt to rescue life or property negligently
endangered by another.45 The theory denies recovery only
when the attempted rescue is reckless in view of all relevant
aspects of the situation;46 thus, the theory recognizes that when
life or property is endangered, a reasonable person will take
greater risk than would ordinarily be justified.47 The rescue
doctrine is compatible with the general principles of negli-
gence: a tortfeasor should foresee that others may attempt to
protect the interests that he has negligently threatened.48 This
proposition is especially compelling when applied to fire
fighters; their presence at a fire is clearly foreseeable.
Although both the rescue and primary assumption of risk
doctrines appear applicable to fire fighters' actions against
landowners, the two doctrines generate opposite results: the
rescue doctrine would generally allow fire fighters to recover,
but the assumption of risk doctrine would not. Consequently,
it is impossible to mechanically generate a just rule for the
44. For a discussion of the application of these arguments to volunteer fire
fighters, see note 69 infra.
45. See, e.g., Shafer v. Gaylord, 287 Minn. 1, 4, 176 N.W.2d 745, 747 (1970);
Talbert v. Talbert, 22 Misc. 2d 782, 784, 199 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214 (Sup. Ct. 1960);
Ruth v. Ruth, 213 Tenn. 82, 88-89, 372 S.W.2d 285, 288 (1963). See also Henjum v.
Bok, 261 Minn. 74, 77, 110 N.W.2d 461, 463 (1961); Berg v. Great N. Ry., 70 Minn.
272, 277, 73 N.W. 648, 649 (1897); Wolfinger v. Shaw, 138 Neb. 229, 236-37, 292 N.W.
731, 735-36 (1940). The rescue doctrine recognizes that there is "an independent
duty of care owed to the rescuer himself, which arises even when the defend-
ant endangers no one's safety but his own." W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 44, at
277 (footnote omitted). See also Provenzo v. Sam, 23 N.Y.2d 256, 260-61, 244
N.E.2d 26, 28-29, 296 N.Y.S.2d 322, 325-26 (1968); Talbert v. Talbert, 22 Misc. 2d
782, 784-85, 199 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214-16 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Ruth v. Ruth, 213 Tenn. 82,
90, 372 S.W.2d 285, 289 (1963).
46. See, e.g., Barnett v. Des Moines Elec. Co., 10 F.2d 111, 114 (8th Cir.
1925); Duff v. Bemidji Motor Serv. Co., 210 Minn. 456, 461, 299 N.W. 196, 199
(1941); Arnold v. Northern States Power Co., 209 Minn. 551, 558, 297 N.W. 182,
186 (1941); Perpich v. Leetonia Mining Co., 118 Minn. 508, 512-13, 137 N.W. 12, 14
(1912).
47. See, e.g., Henjum v. Bok, 261 Minn. 74, 77, 110 N.W.2d 461, 463 (1961);
Duff v. Bemidji Motor Serv. Co., 210 Minn. 456, 460, 299 N.W. 196, 198 (1941);
Perpich v. Leetonia Mining Co., 118 Minn. 508, 512, 137 N.W. 12, 14 (1912).
48. See, e.g., Usry v. Small, 103 Ga. App. 144, 145, 118 S.E.2d 719, 720 (1961);
Brugh v. Bigelow, 310 Mich. 74, 80-81, 16 N.W.2d 668, 671 (1944).
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Armstrong-type situation. The choice between the two doc-
trines must rest on considerations of fairness and social pol-
icy.49
At least one court has argued that the existence of an ade-
quate system of compensation makes imposition of liability on
landowners unnecessary.50 Fire fighters may, along with other
workers, avail themselves of the benefits provided by workers'
compensation laws.5 1 They may also receive service pensions if
disabled by injury or illness arising out of their official duties.5 2
Because these are limited in amount, however, they may not
adequately compensate an injured fire fighter. In addition to a
pension,53 in Minnesota the dependants of a fire fighter killed
in the line of duty are entitled to a $100,000 lump sum payment,
which includes $50,000 from the federal government 54 and
$50,000 from the state government. 55 Because a fire fighter's
work subjects him to a risk of harm greater than that con-
fronting the average worker,5 6 and because the fire fighter is de-
49. The court in Armstrong did not discuss policy considerations. It
merely quoted with approval conclusory language of the California Supreme
Court that described the fireman's rule as "premised on sound public policy
and ... in accord with-if not compelled by-modern tort liability principles."
284 N.W.2d at 349 (quoting Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 203, 571 P.2d 609, 611,
142 Cal. Rptr. 152, 154 (1977)). The Armstrong court directed most of its atten-
tion to showing that abandonment of the rule was not mandated by either the
partial abolition of secondary assumption of risk in Springrose v. Willmore, 292
Minn. 23, 24-26, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827-28 (1971), or the rejection of the licen-
see/invitee distinction in Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 173-74, 199 N.W.2d
639, 647 (1972). See 284 N.W.2d at 348-50.
50. See Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 205-07, 571 P.2d 609, 612-14, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 152, 155-57 (1977).
51. In Minnesota, workers are covered under the Minnesota Workers'
Compensation Act, a system of compensation for employees injured in the
course of their employment. See MmNN. STAT. §§ 176.011-.82 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
52. The fire fighter's relief associations in Minnesota may pay disability
benefits, not to exceed $75 per month, to disabled fire fighters. MINN. STAT.
§§ 424.19-.20 (1978). The relief associations may also pay retirement pensions to
totally disabled fire fighters, MINN. STAT. § 69.41, .45 (1978), and may disburse
the funds without regard to the fire fighter's age or length of service, see Minn.
Op. Att'y Gen. 688m, at 3 (Aug. 27, 1965). Both Duluth and Minneapolis, for in-
stance, have established a disability pension of one-half of a first-class fire
fighter's pay for permanently disabled fire fighters, to be paid without regard to
age or length of service. Telephone interview with Donald Gregg, President,
Minneapolis Fire Department Relief Association (Jan. 18, 1980); Telephone in-
terview with James Heim, Secretary, Duluth Firemen's Pension Office (Jan. 18,
1980).
53. In Minnesota, the pension to a surviving spouse must not exceed $50
per month and the pension to a child, if the surviving spouse is living, must not
exceed $15 per month. MwN. STAT. § 424.24(1) (a), (b) (1978).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 3796(a) (1976).
55. M n. STAT. § 352E.04 (1978).
56. Comment, An Examination of the California Fireman's Rule, 6 PAC.
L.J. 660, 670 (1975).
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nied a cause of action against negligent third parties, an option
that courts extend to other workers,57 these special benefits
seem inadequate.
Some courts have argued that abolition of the fireman's
rule would lead to an increase in litigation-an increase sub-
stantial enough to impede the administration of justice.5 8 This
argument, however, ignores one of the most fundamental prin-
ciples of both constitutional and common law: judicial conven-
ience does not warrant a refusal to protect personal rights.5 9
Even if convenience could justify such a refusal, it is doubtful
that abrogation of the fireman's rule would lead to a dramatic
increase in litigation. Many injuries would be minor,60 and thus
would be fully covered by workers' compensation benefits.6 1
Furthermore, Minnesota law already requires prompt official
investigation of the causes of fires, 6 2 and the results of such in-
vestigations would increase pressures to settle.6 3 Finally, the
employer's statutory right of subrogation would deter firemen
from bringing claims less substantial than the awards available
under the worker's compensation laws, since they would not
stand to benefit financially even if their actions were success-
ful.64
While rejection of the fireman's rule would remove the
57. In California, other workers may recover from negligent third parties.
See Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 213-14, 215, 571 P.2d 609, 617-18, 619, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 152, 160-61, 162 (1977) (Tobriner, Acting C.J., dissenting). The same option
is apparently available in Minnesota. No statutes or cases were found denying
other classes of injured employees a cause of action against negligent third par-
ties not engaged in the furtherance of a common enterprise with the injured
party's employer.
58. See Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 355, 360, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 119, 122 (1968). But see Comment, supra note 56, at 674-76.
59. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 736-37, 441 P.2d 912, 918, 69 CaL
Rptr. 72, 78 (1968) ("[T]he interests of meritorious plaintiffs should prevail over
alleged administrative difficulties."); Simon v. City of New York, 53 Misc. 2d 622,
626, 279 N.Y.S.2d 223, 228 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1967) ("This court cannot concern itself
with the contention that this decision may encourage a multiplicity of lawsuits
since its function is to do justice under the law.").
60. See Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 355, 360, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 119, 122 (1968); Comment, supra note 56, at 675.
61. See note 51 supra.
62. The fire chief of each city in Minnesota is required to investigate both
the cause of every fire that results in more than $100 damage and to report the
results of each investigation to the state, fire marshal. MINN. STAT. § 299F.04
(1978).
63. See Comment, supra note 56, at 675.
64. See id. In Minnesota, the injured worker's employer is allowed to de-
duct from the compensation payable by him the amount obtained by the
worker in an action against the negligent landowner. MIm. STAT. § 176.061(3)-
(6) (1978 & Supp. 1979). See, e.g., Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d
679, 684-89 (Minn. 1977); Courtney v. Babel, 293 Minn. 328, 331-34, 198 N.W.2d 566,
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heavy burden imposed on fire fighters and increase somewhat
the burden on landowners whose negligence proximately
causes injury to fire fighters, it is doubtful that abolition of the
rule would impose any significant burden on nonnegligent
landowners. Although all landowners with liability insurance
would bear some additional expense if abandonment of the
rule led to increased premiums, at least one court has con-
cluded that the additional expense would not necessarily be
substantial.65
Furthermore, it is not clear that the community benefits
from the continued existence of the fireman's rule. The rule
forces the community to bear the expense of compensating the
injured fire fighter out of the public fund.6 6 The burden on the
state treasury would not be eliminated in the absence of the
rule, since injured fire fighters would not have a financial incen-
tive to sue unless public benefits were inadequate. The burden
on the treasury would surely be reduced, however, because the
fire fighter's employer would possess an independent cause of
action for indemnification against the negligent party.67 Fur-
thermore, if the rule were abandoned, the state would acquire a
right of subrogation allowing it to share in the civil damage
awards won by the injured fire fighter and to pursue such ac-
tions itself should the fire fighter decline to do s0.6 8
In sum, the fireman's rule severely burdens fire fighters
without substantially benefiting either the landowner or the
community. It is also doctrinally suspect, both as an unjustified
exception to the rescue doctrine and as an imposition of as-
sumption of risk upon actors whose conduct is arguably
nonvoluntary.69
Even if the court is justified in employing primary assump-
568-70 (1972); Keefer v. Al Johnson Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91, 98-104, 193 N.W.2d
305, 309-13 (1971).
65. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 CaL 2d 108, 118, 443 P.2d 561, 567-68, 70
Cal. Rptr. 97, 103-04 (1968). See also Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 216, 142
Cal. Rptr. 152, 162, 571 P.2d 609, 619 (1977) (Tobriner, Acting C.J., dissenting).
Neither of these cases argues the issue at any length. Both assume that
damages to negligently injured fire fighters would be a very small fraction of
the total insured damages. This assumption is not disputed, directly or indi-
rectly, in any opinions supporting the perpetuation of the fireman's rule.
66. See notes 50-55 supra and accompanying text.
67. M1m . STAT. § 176.061(5) (Supp. 1979).
68. See id.
69. It is difficult to tell how the Ainnesota Supreme Court would classify
volunteer firemen. The nonprofessional nature of volunteer firemen does not
seem relevant to the application of assumption of risk. Application of the res-
cue doctrine, however, would be more appropriately applied to volunteer fire
fighters since the policy underlying that doctrine-encouraging people to be
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tion of risk as the foundation of the Minnesota fireman's rule, it
incorrectly applied that doctrine to the facts of Armstrong. A
fire in an LP gas storage facility threatens an explosion even in
the absence of product defects, but the presence of defects in
the products or installation can increase the likelihood of an
explosion.7 0 The court did not consider whether the fire
fighters would have adopted a different means of fighting the
blaze had they known of the improper operation of the relief
valve. The evidence on this issue was too inconclusive for as-
sumption of risk to be found as a matter of law.7 '
The arguments militating against the court's use of as-
sumption of risk principles in the negligence action 72 apply
with equal force to its use of those principles in the strict liabil-
ity actions for product defects and maintenance of a dangerous
instrumentality. The court discussed none of these arguments,
although it observed that "certain types of the plaintiff's con-
duct may provide a complete or partial bar to recovery in an ac-
tion predicated upon strict liability."73 In support of this
contention, the court cited only cases in which the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent, that is, cases in which the plaintiff sec-
ondarily assumed the risk.74 The court too hastily concluded
that because some types of plaintiff conduct prevent recovery,
primary assumption of risk also prevents recovery.75
good samaritans-would ostensibly be better served through its application to
volunteers than to professionals who are already obliged to fight fires.
Injured volunteer fire fighters receive compensatory benefits similar to the
benefits provided for professional firemen. Dependants of volunteer firemen re-
ceive the same lump sum death benefits as dependants of professional firemen.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796(a), 3796b(3) (1976); MIN. STAT. §§ 352E.01(2)(g), .04 (1978
& Supp. 1979). Injured Minnesota volunteer fire fighters also receive disability
pensions under MmN. STAT. §§ 69.771-.772, 424.03, .19 (1978). See MINN. STAT.
§ 176.011(9) (Supp. 1979).
70. See 284 N.W.2d at 353.
71. The plaintiff's assumption of risk is a question for the jury unless the
evidence is conclusive. See Hansen v. City of Minneapolis, 261 Minn. 568, 571,
113 N.W.2d 508, 510-11 (1962); Geis v. Hodgman, 255 Minn. 1, 6, 95 N.W.2d 311, 315
(1959).
72. See text accompanying notes 58-64 supra.
73. 284 N.W.2d at 351.
74. Id. Two cases were cited. Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377
(Minn. 1977) (driver of defectively manufactured vehicle was found to be 15%
negligent in causing accident); Magnuson v. Rupp MIg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 171
N.W.2d 201 (1969) (plaintiff injured while driving snowmobile he knew to be de-
fectively manufactured).
75. There has been much discussion and much disagreement involving this
complex and controversial issue. Professor Prosser stated, without disap-
proval, that assumption of risk would probably be employed in cases involving
the strict liability of product suppliers. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE LJ. 1099, 1148 (1960). Professor
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Even if the assumption of risk doctrine is relevant to a
strict liability action, it is not clear that the elements necessary
for such an assumption of risk were present in the facts of Arm-
strong. The firemen were aware that certain risks attended
their task.76 This awareness, although perhaps sufficient to
make assumption of risk initially plausible in the negligence
and dangerous instrumentality actions, could not function simi-
larly in the products liability action. Knowledge of the dangers
associated with an LP fire cannot be equated with knowledge of
the hidden defects in the LP gas facility itself, and knowledge
of the defects is necessary in products liability cases for as-
sumption of risk to be found.7 7
The application of the assumption of risk theory to the
facts in Armstrong may indicate a shift in the court's interpre-
tation of that doctrine as it is applied to all plaintiffs, not simply
fire fighters. By holding that the fire fighters in Armstrong as-
sumed the risks inherent in the fire, including the installation
of the improper valve on the fuel truck, the court may be as-
serting that a plaintiff can assume a risk without appreciating
either the magnitude of that risk or the probability that it will
result in harm. Such a change in theory could impose assump-
tion of risk on plaintiffs whose actions were neither voluntary
nor intelligent. The absence of any affirmative indication in the
Keeton, however, argued that the doctrine should not be applied in strict prod-
ucts liability actions. He analogized the situation in these cases to that in
workers' compensation cases and argued that when liability ceases to be
grounded upon the creation of unreasonable risk, assumption is no longer a
good answer to plaintiff's claim. In his view, assumption of risk (a doctrine that
denies recovery to one who has coauthored his own harm) is conceptually in-
separable from a jurisprudence that views fault as the principal justification for
shifting loss in tort. In rejecting fault for the principle that loss and risk of loss
should be apportioned where it can be most easily borne and distributed, strict
liability must necessarily reject assumption of risk. Keeton, Assumption of
Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 L. L. REV. 122, 149-66 (1961). More re-
cently, Professor Twerski argues that allowing assumption of risk in strict prod-
ucts liability cases would reduce the manufacturer's incentive to produce a safe
product. Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk
in the Products Liability Era, 60 IowA L. REv. 1, 48-51 (1974). He nevertheless
recommends a pragmatic, expedient use of assumption of risk in the products
area and would determine in each case, with each product, whether the manu-
facturer should protect the plaintiff who decides to use a product knowing that
it is defective.
76. The fire fighters knew that an explosion was possible. They did not
know of the defective relief valve that greatly increased the probability of an
explosion. See notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind.
1965); Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 49, 171 N.W.2d 201, 211 (1969);
Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 274 Ore. 403, 409-10, 547 P.2d 132, 138 (1976); Big-
ham v. J.C. Penney Co., 268 N.W.2d 892, 895-96 (Minn. 1978).
1980]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
opinion that the court was overruling previous assumption of
risk cases, however, suggests that the court did not intend to al-
ter significantly the doctrine of assumption of risk. Neverthe-
less, until the court clarifies its position, the scope of the
doctrine of assumption of risk in Minnesota will remain uncer-
tain.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's inadequate discussion of
policy considerations in Armstrong makes it difficult to under-
stand the status and foundation of both the modified Minnesota
fireman's rule and the assumption of risk doctrine in general.
The court failed to adequately justify its application of assump-
tion of risk principles. The court did not discuss the considera-
tions of fairness and social policy which suggest that
perpetuation of the fireman's rule will burden both fire fighters
and the community without substantially benefiting nonnegli-
gent landowners. Fire fighters perform an essential public
service, yet neither their salaries nor the other benefits cur-
rently available to them in Minnesota provide full compensa-
tion for catastrophic injuries. Considerations of fairness and
social policy strongly support the abandonment of the fireman's
rule, through either a finding that a fire fighter's decision to
fight a fire is not voluntary in the relevant sense of the word, or
a finding that the rescue doctrine should apply.
[Vol. 64.878
